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Non-conscious processes in changing health-related behaviour: a conceptual analysis and 
framework 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Much of the global burden of non-communicable disease is caused by unhealthy behaviours 
that individuals enact even when informed of their health-harming consequences. A key insight is 
that these behaviours are not predominantly driven by deliberative conscious decisions, but occur 
directly in response to environmental cues and without necessary representation of their 
consequences. Consequently, interventions that target non-conscious rather than conscious 
processes to change health behaviour may have significant potential, but this important premise 
remains largely untested. This is in part due to the lack of a practicable conceptual framework that 
can be applied to better describe and assess these interventions. We propose a framework for 
describing or categorising interventions to change health behaviour by the degree to which their 
effects may be considered non-conscious. Potential practical issues with applying such a framework 
are discussed, as are the implications for further research to inform the testing and development of 
interventions. A pragmatic means of conceptualising interventions targeted at non-conscious 
processes is a necessary prelude to testing the potency of such interventions. This can ultimately 
inform the development of interventions with the potential to shape healthier behaviours across 
populations.    
 
Keywords: health behaviour; non-conscious; awareness; automatic; intervention; behaviour 
change 
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The growing global burden of non-communicable disease (principally cancers, diabetes and 
cardiovascular disease) is largely determined by behaviours that are potentially modifiable, namely 
excessive consumption of food and alcohol, physical inactivity, and smoking (WHO, 2014). 
Furthermore, these behaviours are socially patterned, being more common amongst those who are 
most socially deprived, thereby contributing to the increased morbidity and premature mortality 
observed in these groups (Stringhini et al., 2010). Yet such behaviours and their patterns have 
proven remarkably resistant to attempts to change them. Identifying interventions that are effective 
in changing health-related behaviours across populations and thereby reduce health inequalities 
arising from the social patterning of such behaviours is one of the foremost global public health 
challenges. It has been proposed that interventions that target non-conscious processes may prove 
effective in changing behaviour in populations, and potentially more so than interventions that 
principally engage conscious deliberative processes (Marteau, Hollands, & Fletcher, 2012). This 
important premise remains largely untested, however, hampered by the lack of a practicable 
conceptual framework necessary for characterising the processes by which interventions elicit 
behavioural responses. In this review, we outline a pragmatic approach to enable researchers to 
better describe the relative extent to which any given intervention to change health-related 
behaviours targets non-conscious processes, and thus begin to address these important issues.  
Historically, the principal focus of non-regulatory approaches to changing health-related 
behaviour has been on information-based interventions (Marteau, Hollands, & Kelly, 2015). These 
interventions typically provide a persuasive message comprising verbal or numerical information to 
prompt individuals on the value or consequences of engaging in a given behaviour, leading to the 
formation of intentions to change that behaviour. They may also teach the skills necessary for 
change. Such approaches can provide the same generalised information to all members of a given 
population, for example by using mass media to disseminate informative anti-smoking messages 
(Bala, Strzeszynski, Topor-Madry, & Cahill, 2013). Alternatively, they may use biological or 
genetic test information to provide personalised information to individuals about health risks 
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attributable to dietary intake or physical inactivity. There is, however, an increasing recognition that 
many of these interventions are of limited effectiveness (Marteau et al., 2012). Whilst this 
observation is in accordance with evidence of limited intentional control of behaviour (Webb & 
Sheeran, 2006), it is important to clarify that this is not to dismiss the potential effectiveness of all 
interventions that purposefully engage conscious processes via, for example, providing persuasive 
information or facilitating problem solving or planning (including deliberative efforts to automate 
future responses to internal and external cues). Rather than being inherently ineffective, it may 
instead be that the content of such interventions is often inappropriately conceived or directed. 
Indeed, there is evidence for the effectiveness of a range of such interventions including smoking 
cessation programmes (West, May, West, Croghan, & McEwen, 2013), weight loss programmes 
(Jebb et al., 2011) and implementation intention interventions (Bélanger-Gravel, Godin, & 
Amireault, 2013) including when these are scaled up to population-level application (Neter, Stein, 
Barnett-Griness, Rennert, & Hagoel, 2014). However, the limited effectiveness that is often 
observed, particularly for predominantly information-based interventions, should prompt us to 
explore the potential of an additional approach, one that entails interventions that do not focus on 
engaging conscious deliberation via explicit communication, but instead target non-conscious 
processes occurring outside awareness.  
 Many processes determining our behaviour are non-conscious (Bargh & Morsella, 2008; 
Bargh, Schwader, Hailey, Dyer, & Boothby, 2012). It follows that interventions that target non-
conscious processes may therefore prove effective in changing behaviour in populations (Marteau et 
al., 2012). Of particular interest are interventions that do not require individual delivery, targeting or 
instruction by those intervening, as these have the greatest potential to be readily scalable to the 
population level. Interventions meeting these criteria typically comprise changes to characteristics 
of the physical and social environments that surround us and shape our behaviour (Swinburn et al., 
2011). Such interventions can be broadly classified as those that alter i) the properties, or ii) the 
placement of external stimuli (see a recent typology of micro-environmental or choice architecture 
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interventions (Hollands et al., 2013) and Appendix 1 for further details and examples). These 
interventions do not require complex information to be understood in order for a behavioural 
response to be generated. Furthermore, as they are less dependent on levels of literacy, numeracy 
and self-regulatory capabilities, they may be particularly effective in those who are most socially 
deprived and who can be disadvantaged in such domains (Moffitt et al., 2011; Spears, 2010). 
Reflecting these considerations, there is growing interest across the fields of psychology, 
behavioural economics, neuroscience, public health and policy in the potency of external stimuli to 
change behaviour outside awareness (Cohen & Babey, 2012; Dolan, Hallsworth, Halpern, King, & 
Vlaev, 2010; Felsen, Castelo, & Reiner, 2013; Lisman & Sternberg, 2013; Marteau et al., 2012; 
Sheeran, Gollwitzer, & Bargh, 2013; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). These ideas have also gained 
traction within government and policy circles worldwide (Nesterak, 2014).  
 Whilst prior literature has examined the processes by which health-related behaviour may be 
influenced outside of awareness (Cohen & Babey, 2012; Sheeran et al., 2013), despite high levels of 
interest and optimism, robust evidence of effectiveness of interventions that target non-conscious 
processes remains scarce. There are reports of interventions that impact on behaviour despite 
finding that participants are typically unaware of being exposed to the intervention (Maas, de 
Ridder, de Vet, & de Wit, 2012; Papies & Hamstra, 2010; van Kleef, Otten, & van Trijp, 2012). 
There are also a small number of systematic reviews and meta-analyses of interventions that could 
reasonably be assumed to operate at least partly outside of conscious awareness, such as altering 
food portion, package and tableware size (Hollands et al., 2015), that indicate important effects on 
behaviour. However, as was observed in Hollands et al.’s systematic review, participant awareness 
in intervention studies is often not assessed, or is minimally reported. Research efforts towards 
testing the important central premise – that interventions targeting non-conscious processes may 
have significant potential - and ultimately identifying and developing effective interventions, are 
hampered by the lack of a practicable conceptual framework necessary for coherent research 
characterising their effects. To examine whether interventions can reasonably be characterised as 
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having potential to influence behaviour via targeting non-conscious processes, we first explore what 
is meant by conscious and non-conscious activation of behaviour by external cues or stimuli.  
 
Conceptualising conscious and non-conscious activation of behaviour 
 
Determining whether any given behaviour can be described as conscious is a complex task. 
Each behaviour and its activation is a composite of many conscious and non-conscious processes 
and may arise from an array of internal and external cues and their interaction. This is further 
complicated by the fact that behaviours can be analysed and described at a number of levels and so 
the admixture of conscious and non-conscious processing may be different depending on the level 
at which the analysis is applied. For example, if I talk about a bicycle ride, my description may 
invoke the non-conscious processes that keep me balanced and moving, the conscious processes of 
deliberating where I am going and why, and a host of processes in between that may each in 
themselves be described at different levels. My route may be a well-known one that I may cycle 
automatically without deliberation, or it may be a novel one laboriously followed with a map. To 
take another example, of eating some potato chips, I may be aware of the endpoint of actually 
eating the chips, but not necessarily aware of why I am eating the chips. Rather than being a result 
of a premeditated decision, the behaviour may have been activated by an environmental cue such as 
a television advertisement, the influence of which I was unaware (Harris, Bargh, & Brownell, 
2009). The key point here, and one to which we will return, is that, when we identify processes as 
conscious or non-conscious, we must be clear about the scale and level of analysis we are 
employing. We propose that by applying a consistent framework we can find an appropriate level to 
describe and analyse behaviours as a prelude to developing interventions aimed at changing them. 
The distinction between conscious and non-conscious behaviour may be informative in the context 
of developing ways to change population health behaviour because it reflects the degree of 
conscious deliberation that is required for a behaviour to be activated by a given intervention.  
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Conceptions of conscious and non-conscious behaviour can be framed in relation to 
dualisms that are present across the behavioural and brain sciences. Dual-process or dual-systems 
models of behaviour have received increasing attention in recent years within behavioural science 
and psychology (Hofmann, Friese, & Wiers, 2008; Sherman, Gawronski, & Trope, 2014; Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004). Such models propose two broad systems of human behaviour, one comprising 
actions towards identified goals resulting from reflective, reasoned processes, and the other 
comprising actions resulting from automatic associative processes cued by external stimuli. A 
number of terms has been applied to denote these two systems. We use the terms reflective and 
automatic to represent multiple, nuanced underlying components and conceptualisations. Although 
it is convenient to characterise reflective behaviour as conscious and automatic as non-conscious, 
Bargh (1994) and Moors and De Houwer (2006) deconstruct the meaning of automaticity, 
highlighting that this relates to multiple components or processes with varying degrees of overlap, 
each of which has been used to characterise automaticity. It is therefore more precise to consider 
these components individually. We focus here on the conscious-nonconscious dimension, which is 
widely invoked on its own terms and is also used to represent broader conceptions of automaticity 
in the behaviour change literature.  
Within the behavioural neuroscience literature, a distinction is commonly made between 
habitual and goal-directed behaviour. Simply put, habitual responding entails an action prompted by 
the presence of a stimulus without the necessary representation of the goal of that action, the latter 
representation being a characteristic of goal-directed behaviour (see Gardner (2015) for a review of 
the habits literature as applied to health-related behaviour). This distinction provides a flexible, 
though simple, means of describing behaviours, but the question of how these phenomena relate to 
a distinction between conscious and non-conscious behaviour is complex. Lisman and Sternberg 
(2013) proposed that non-conscious behaviour equates to habitual behaviour, and conscious 
behaviour to non-habitual behaviour. Given that goal-directed behaviour is essentially characterised 
by the representation of a goal, this is a plausible idea. However, we suggest that, for practical 
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purposes, it is more useful to consider both habitual and non-habitual behaviour as having the 
potential to be conscious or non-conscious depending upon the level of analysis. This is because, as 
already mentioned, any given behaviour comprises an admixture of conscious and non-conscious 
processes that may differ depending on the level at which analysis is applied. We provide here only 
a simplified overview of the literature on non-conscious processes and automaticity. More extensive 
literature reviews are available (Bargh et al., 2012; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). 
 
Key considerations in describing non-conscious activation of behaviour  
 
Figure 1 highlights two key premises that underpin our framework and merit further consideration: 
i) A comprehensive analysis of a behaviour requires that we consider the enacted behaviour 
alongside the processes by which it is activated; and ii) many levels of analysis are possible when 
describing a behaviour and awareness of the activation of behaviour. (INSERT FIGURE 1) 
 
i) A comprehensive analysis of a behaviour requires that we consider the enacted 
behaviour alongside the processes by which it is activated. It has been suggested that if a person 
is able to report on an action then this constitutes conscious behaviour. Lisman and Sternberg 
(2013), apply the example of advertising, which, while it may trigger non-conscious processes, 
ultimately leads to conscious performance of a behaviour, such as buying a chocolate bar. They 
state that, ”The fact that conscious decisions can be influenced by unconscious factors does not 
alter the fact that the decision itself is reportable and therefore conscious”(pg.278). Whilst this 
criterion may appear initially reasonable and straightforward to apply, adopting it would 
nonetheless place considerable constraints on a comprehensive understanding of health-related 
behaviours. By focusing on the ultimate behavioural endpoint (such as buying a chocolate bar) and 
omitting consideration of the multiple processes that activated and shaped this behaviour, we 
sidestep important complexities and limit our ability to describe and explain it. We suggest that a 
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more detailed examination of the processes by which a behaviour is activated can be helpful and so 
we should instead aim to consider the intermediary processes by which the cueing stimulus 
activates the response. Within this context, we propose, consistent with the position taken by other 
authors (Chartrand, 2005; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), that conscious activation of behaviour 
comprises awareness of the causal link between the stimulus that activates the behavioural response 
and the performance of the behaviour. However, formation of such a causal inference that there was 
an effect of the stimulus on one’s behaviour, logically requires awareness of both the external 
stimulus and of the ensuing behaviour. Therefore, the degree to which behaviour activated by 
external stimuli might be considered non-conscious, is a function of the extent to which the actor is 
aware of the following elements: 
a) the external stimulus (i.e. the intervention);  
b) the ensuing behaviour; and 
c) the causal link between a) the stimulus and b) the behaviour 
It is important to emphasise that our focus is on activation of behaviour by external stimuli because 
our aim is to characterise differential awareness of the effects of external stimuli, in the form of 
interventions to change behaviour. For the sake of parsimony, we are also invoking a single external 
stimulus, but of course acknowledge that multiple external and also internal stimuli will often 
continue to be important determinants of behaviour irrespective of any intervention. Furthermore, 
people vary in terms of the stimuli to which they expose themselves and the effects thereof. 
Whilst the theoretical position outlined here is not novel, our specific focus, upon translating 
these concepts for application to interventions to change health-related behaviour, is novel. We will 
now discuss each of the three elements above in turn. As illustration, throughout the following 
discussion we will draw on a set of exemplar intervention types (derived from Hollands et al, 2013) 
that have been implemented to shape healthier dietary behaviour: altering portion sizes of food 
(sizing) (Rolls, Roe, & Meengs, 2010); exposing shoppers to recipe posters to prime dieting goals 
(priming) (Papies & Hamstra, 2010); placing foods nearer or further away from people (proximity) 
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(Maas et al., 2012); and altering the relative availability of healthy and unhealthy food options 
(availability) (van Kleef et al., 2012). These interventions are appropriate case studies as they have 
the potential to activate behaviour via non-conscious processes. They do not rely on conscious 
deliberation of explicit information and it is therefore less likely that the actor will be cognizant of, 
or reflect upon, their intended effects. This is demonstrated in the cited examples of each, in which 
participant awareness of the intervention to which they have been exposed has been assessed, 
revealing most to be unaware.   
a) Awareness of the external stimulus (i.e. the intervention). Dehaene, Changeux, 
Naccache, Sackur, and Sergent (2006) discuss the characteristics of conscious processing with a 
focus on the perception of visual stimuli. But how does this translate to interventions that occur in 
real-world environments, where there may be a complex range of stimuli (not only visual) and 
differing across a range of properties or characteristics? One possibility is to define consciousness 
in relation to simple awareness of the presence versus absence of the external stimulus. In the case 
of portion sizing interventions, this would mean awareness of the presence of the food portion that 
was subject to manipulation. Because nearly all instances of naturally occurring stimuli are 
supraliminal (Bargh & Morsella, 2008), this places a relatively low threshold on the assessment of 
consciousness. As such, we would be highly likely to ascribe awareness of the stimulus if we used 
such a criterion. A more stringent test and a more appropriate threshold when thinking about 
changing behaviour is awareness of the specific properties or characteristics of the stimulus that 
comprise the intervention manipulation (the more detailed this is able to be, the more it is 
suggestive of increasing awareness). These levels of awareness can be determined on their own 
(absolute) terms, or in relative terms, as a difference relative to a prior exposure to the same or 
similar stimulus or environment. Which is more appropriate would depend on the nature of the 
implementation. In the example of portion size, this would mean awareness of the size or volume of 
the food portion (i.e. absolute), or awareness of a difference in size or volume of the food portion 
relative to a prior exposure in a comparable context (i.e. relative). For the previously cited example 
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of priming, this may mean awareness of the poster or the recipe content therein; and for proximity 
and availability, respectively, the notable closeness or distance of the food or the notably large or 
small number of healthy or unhealthy food options that are available.  
b) Awareness of the ensuing behaviour. An actor’s awareness of a given behaviour 
(e.g. eating food) can be characterised at a variety of levels. First, he or she may have no awareness 
that they have acted at all (e.g. not aware that they are eating or have eaten food subsequent to 
exposure to the stimulus). Second, he or she may be aware that they have acted in some way, but 
with limited awareness of the properties or characteristics of this behaviour. For example, they may 
be aware of eating or having eaten food but not aware of the amount of food consumed. Third, an 
actor may possess a higher level of awareness, which could be demonstrated either in absolute or 
relative terms. For example, they may be aware of eating a specified amount of food (absolute), or 
of eating a higher, similar or lower amount of food relative to typical or previous behaviour in a 
comparable context (relative).  
A problem with trying to ascribe consciousness to a behaviour, even using a well-
operationalised approach, is the complexity mentioned previously: any behaviour inevitably arises 
from a composite of a multitude of smaller, intermediary behaviours and processes, for which we 
could potentially assess awareness. For example, in the context of research on portion sizing 
interventions, likely outcomes of interest would be total consumption of, or total energy intake 
from, the food product which is subject to the intervention. However, if we wished, we could 
instead choose to focus on the speed of an individual’s first approach to the food, or the amount 
they consumed in their first bite – and assess awareness correspondingly. In short, there comes a 
level of description where aspects of even the most reflective of behaviours fall below the level of 
awareness. A parallel can be drawn to the habits literature where it has been proposed that for 
complex behaviours it may be helpful to distinguish between the processes of (habitual) initiation of 
a behaviour and its performance (Gardner, 2015). However, what might seem a profound problem 
of characterising behaviour is of lesser concern in the context of a pragmatic approach to changing 
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behaviour. Whilst, at a fine enough grain, any behaviour might be dismantled into non-conscious 
parts, the pertinent question is whether the level of analysis is relevant to the changes in behaviour 
we aim to elicit, before considering the question of awareness at that level.  When working within 
the context of a behaviour change intervention we may often choose a higher-level behavioural 
endpoint, such as a selection or consumption behaviour, given the ultimate goal of demonstrating a 
change in behaviour that has some wider significance for health outcomes. There may also be 
contexts where a focus on a lower-level behaviour is equally or more relevant to the changes in 
behaviour that the intervention is intended to elicit, such as reducing bite size or speed of chewing 
(Shah et al., 2014).  
c) Awareness of the causal link between a) the stimulus and b) the behaviour. This 
criterion ultimately determines whether we can ascribe conscious activation of behaviour, but as 
illustrated in Figure 1, awareness of the causal link is logically predicated on an actor having some 
awareness of both the stimulus (the intervention) and of their resulting behaviour. If awareness of 
either of these components is absent then awareness of the causal link is inevitably also absent, and 
this would then be regarded as an example of non-conscious activation of behaviour. If awareness 
of both is present, but the actor remains unaware of a causal link, then again this would be regarded 
as representing non-conscious activation of the behaviour. As such, non-conscious behaviour in this 
context is characterised by a lack of awareness of the effect of external stimuli on one’s behaviour 
(Bargh & Morsella, 2008). Conversely, if individuals are aware of all three elements then this 
would be regarded as an example of conscious activation of behaviour. Applying the example of 
portion sizing, an awareness of the causal link, and thus conscious activation of behaviour, would 
comprise a recognition that the characteristics of the behaviour (e.g. five sandwiches were eaten, or 
more sandwiches were eaten than usual) were influenced by the characteristics of the stimulus (e.g. 
the large number of sandwiches that was presented for consumption). Awareness is, however, a 
matter of degree and varies along a spectrum, meaning that individuals may recognise a causal link 
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but misjudge its extent. As we now discuss, characterising the level of awareness also depends on 
the level of analysis that we apply.  
ii. Many levels of analysis are possible when describing a behaviour and awareness of the 
activation of behaviour. Lisman and Sternberg (2013) propose that if a decision about a behaviour 
is reportable then it is conscious. This raises the question as to what precisely is meant by a 
‘decision’ that is to be reported. Applying simple distinctions between awareness and a lack thereof 
may be relatively straightforward in a laboratory context, where awareness of a behaviour may refer 
to simply eating or not eating a food item presented to a participant where there are relatively few 
competing behavioural (or physical/spatial) possibilities. But if we take the example of buying a 
bottle of branded beer from a supermarket, how does Lisman and Sternberg’s concept of conscious 
behaviour apply? Awareness of the behavioural decision is an ambiguous criterion because it could 
be applied at numerous levels of specificity or levels of explanation. It could mean awareness of 
several possible decisions, ranging from non-specific (such as the decision to take any amount of 
any alcoholic beverage from the shelf) to specific (such as the decision to take four bottles of a 
specific brand of bottled beer and none of any other brand). Alternatively, it could refer to different 
stages of activation of the behaviour, ranging from awareness of a prior realisation of wanting to 
purchase some beer at the supermarket, to awareness of placing bottles of beer in a shopping basket. 
Does awareness at any one of these points count as an equivalent demonstration of conscious 
activation of behaviour? We would argue that it does not and that it may be instructive to think in 
more nuanced terms about the nature of awareness of any given behaviour.  
This example illustrates what we call the issue of specificity: awareness of behaviour and of its 
activation is a concept always understood relative to the level of specificity that is applied by the 
assessor. When we assess the degree of awareness of the activation of a behaviour, the more 
specific we are in our assessment of what constitutes awareness (i.e. the more detailed the 
knowledge we require from our interrogation), the less likely it is that the actor will be able to 
demonstrate awareness of the process, and thus the more likely we are to attribute any observed 
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behaviour to a process of non-conscious activation. For example, if a person is presented with a 
large bowl of chocolate pudding, we might reasonably expect them to be aware whether they had 
consumed any of the pudding or not, but may not expect them to be aware of the precise absolute 
amount that they had consumed. Consequently, an inability to distinguish the amount being 
consumed may not represent a fundamental lack of awareness, but instead represent the difficulty of 
reporting such detailed objective information. We might, however, reasonably expect an adequate 
assessment of relative consumption, such as of having eating more or less pudding than usual. 
In line with our prior comments concerning identifying an appropriate behavioural outcome, in 
assessing awareness of the activation of behaviour there is a need to apply a degree of specificity 
that is consistent with the aim of the specified intervention. Furthermore, if any assessment is to 
have the potential to aid in characterising behaviour by degree, it must possess the potential to 
detect differences in responses and so the threshold for ascribing awareness must not be set 
inappropriately low or high. 
 
Applying a framework of conscious and non-conscious activation of behaviour by an 
intervention (PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE) 
 
In Figure 2, we present a framework applied to the context of interventions to change 
behaviour. This highlights that if the criteria we have outlined are consistently applied to such 
interventions, we can distinguish between relatively non-conscious and relatively conscious 
behaviour activation. It also indicates that these are broad and not discrete categories and awareness 
is most meaningfully viewed as occurring on a continuum.  
Previously in this article, we assumed, for brevity and simplicity, an idealised situation in 
which we are able to assess the outlined criteria directly. Our concern, however, is with 
characterising interventions to change behaviour in real-world situations. We now consider how we 
may be able to characterise the extent to which any given intervention targets non-conscious 
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processes, or in other words, is less reliant on engaging conscious deliberative processes. We can do 
this by applying the framework in Figure 2 to the effects of interventions. Awareness of the 
activation of behaviour can be assessed using various measurement approaches, although explicit 
measurement has been the predominant approach.  
Assessment of awareness of behaviour activation. Within the context of interventions or 
manipulations to change behaviour, the typical approach to operationalising the assessment of 
awareness of behaviour activation is to ask individuals directly. We regard self-report suggesting 
that an individual is unaware of the causal link between intervention stimuli and subsequent 
behaviour as a minimum necessary requirement for demonstrating that an intervention targets non-
conscious processes. A funnel debriefing procedure may be employed by which individuals are 
asked increasingly specific questions about the nature of the intervention they have been exposed to 
and its potential for influencing their behaviour (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Participants may 
initially be asked if they are able to determine the broad purpose or hypotheses of the study, 
assuming that there is adequate blinding to this incorporated within the study design. Such general 
questions (e.g. “What do you think the study was about? What do you think the aim of the research 
is?”) are relevant in characterising the degree to which an intervention targets conscious 
engagement with its content. They allow assessment of whether participants recognise any potential 
link between the intervention and behaviour, for themselves or others, even if the intervention is 
ineffective. We may then move on to more specific questions to determine whether they noticed the 
characteristics of the stimuli that were presented, and whether they were aware of any link between 
these stimuli and their subsequent behaviour (e.g. “Did you notice anything special or notable about 
the (room/ shop/ restaurant/ meal options/ food you were given)?”; “Did anything (you were asked 
to do / you noticed in the room) affect your actions or how you were thinking?”) whilst being 
careful not to direct people towards specific responses. For these types of more specific questions, 
we would anticipate a lesser degree of awareness to be exhibited for a similarly effective 
intervention that targets non-conscious (versus conscious) processes.  
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If we again consider the example of portion sizing interventions, several researchers have 
assessed awareness in such a way. For example, Rolls et al. (2010), assigned participants to a series 
of differently-sized portions of broccoli (as part of a meal) to see how this affected consumption. 
The researchers subsequently enquired about participants’ opinions of the purpose of the study but 
also whether they noticed any differences between the different experimental sessions. Despite this 
study employing a within-subjects design, making it more likely that the manipulated characteristics 
of the stimulus (i.e. the size of the portion) would be more salient, participants typically remained 
unaware of the purpose of the study and often of the experimental manipulation of portion size. In a 
priming intervention, Papies et al (2010) exposed participants to either a recipe poster displayed at a 
store entrance – an intervention designed to elicit dieting goals, or no poster – the control condition. 
When participants were asked whether they had noticed anything special about the store, fewer than 
20% of participants in the intervention condition mentioned the recipe poster. This provides some 
support for characterising these interventions as having the potential to activate behaviour via non-
conscious processes, as participants did not typically notice the experimental manipulations.  
As highlighted in recent reviews and commentaries (Doyen, Klein, Simons, & Cleeremans, 
2014; Hagger et al., 2015; Labrecque & Wood, 2015; Newell & Shanks, 2014), assessing awareness 
of cognitive and behavioural processes via self-report has limitations. Doyen et al. (2014) identify a 
number of concerns, suggesting that verbal reports are inadequate for claiming processing without 
awareness. Our position on the use of such measures is as follows. First, we do not think that use of 
a self-report measure is invalidated because it fails to meet criteria proposed as necessary for 
documenting the complete absence of awareness. As these authors themselves assert, the need for 
documenting the complete absence of awareness depends on the claims that the researcher wishes to 
make. In research on behavioural interventions, we are ultimately interested in describing and 
developing more effective ways of changing behaviour. Understanding the underlying mechanisms 
is important in so far as it enables us to develop better interventions, but it is fundamentally a means 
to an end. We have no requirement to validate a theoretical position by definitively demonstrating 
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the activation of non-conscious or conscious processes. Instead, by implementing the basic 
framework that we outline, we may be able to better characterise different types of interventions, by 
highlighting the variability in the degree to which they target non-conscious processes or to which 
they require conscious deliberation or engagement to change behaviour (at least as far as this is able 
to be assessed). This is the potential value that such an approach offers, even if this value largely 
remains to be demonstrated through the accretion of relevant data.   
Second, we acknowledge that people are often unable (and at times unwilling) to report 
accurately on their own behaviour, and more so when a response is required after the fact (Nisbett 
& Wilson, 1977). Due to cognitive limitations and thus an inability to report relevant information, 
conscious report is imperfect and often rather limited in what it can capture. This means that we 
should not rely on detailed accounts of underlying mechanisms beyond the basic criteria we have 
outlined and, in determining and interpreting those criteria, apply a critical and cautious perspective. 
Even imperfect measures should, however, have the potential to fulfil the promise of the outlined 
approach, in at least enabling a broad mapping of relative levels of awareness between different 
interventions. 
 Supplementary methods for assessing awareness. There may, however, be 
supplementary methods to self-report assessment that allow us to further corroborate or better 
characterise such an assessment. Bargh and Chartrand (2000) highlight the role of follow-up tests in 
corroborating the findings of funnel debriefing procedures, such as to determine actors’ ability to 
recognise and discriminate the stimuli they have been exposed to. It is not, however, immediately 
obvious to us how such approaches could be applied consistently to tests of interventions to change 
behaviour in real-world settings, where interventions may comprise a complex range of stimuli that 
differ across a range of properties. Alternative supplementary approaches may therefore be more 
adaptable.  
First, we may employ implicit measures of cognition to assess the activation of cue-
behaviour associative networks (Hagger, Rebar, Mullan, Lipp, & Chatzisarantis, 2015). Instead of 
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direct assessment via intentional report (e.g. questionnaire items), such measures assess processing 
via indirect assessment, such as response time tasks, that does not require awareness of the meaning 
of the response or the mental content that is being assessed (Nosek, Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011). If 
we observe that a) such measures are affected by an intervention and this mediates the effect of the 
intervention on the behaviour; and b) that measures that rely on direct reportability (such as 
questionnaire measures of reward value or behavioural intentions (Conroy, Hyde, Doerksen, & 
Ribeiro, 2010), are unaffected and do not mediate behavioural effects, then this provides additional 
detail for characterising the intervention as principally targeting non-conscious processes (though 
we cannot assume that the measures were comprehensive). This approach has been little applied to 
the study of interventions that are scalable to population-level, which is unsurprising given the 
practical challenges with gathering data on complex measures in a group intervention setting. It has, 
however, been used in controlled laboratory studies of behaviour change interventions (Hollands, 
Prestwich, & Marteau, 2011).  
A second possible supplementary approach is to test whether, in the delivery of an 
intervention, adding explicit instructions to participants to encourage conscious deliberation on the 
mechanism of the intervention impacts on its effectiveness. For example, in a recent study 
(Cavanagh, Vartanian, Herman, & Polivy, 2014), participants were instructed regarding the way in 
which external influences, such as portion size, may affect food intake, including how to reduce 
such influences on their behaviour. This did not alter the effect of portion sizing on behaviour, i.e. 
those given this instruction ate as much when provided with a larger portion as those not provided 
with this instruction. The fact that following the provision of such information, participants did not 
moderate the effect of the intervention, is compatible with the effect of portion size on behaviour 
not being reliant on conscious engagement. This approach requires us to also apply the 
aforementioned explicit self-report approach; otherwise a possible interpretation is that the 
intervention is already working as a result of conscious engagement and so the additional explicit 
instructions will not affect this. A third, related approach is to test whether restricting one’s ability 
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to consciously engage with an intervention, for example, by simultaneously imposing a cognitive 
load, moderates the effect of an intervention. We would predict that if the effect of the intervention 
does not require conscious activation, then imposing a cognitive load would not significantly 
moderate it. However, we note that imposition of cognitive load may affect cognitive control of 
behaviour as well as conscious engagement. Further work is therefore needed to describe more 
precisely the cognitive resources needed for non-conscious behavioural control to ensure that these 
are not restricted in any attempt to restrict conscious behavioural control. 
At present, it may be challenging to apply anything other than basic self-report measures of 
awareness to interventions implemented in the field, but we have aimed to highlight that there is 
value in applying pragmatic although imperfect methods. We do not, however, intend to deny the 
impetus to develop better approaches and more robust measures - challenges laid down should be 
regarded as a valuable catalyst towards increased precision and rigour in our methods, our reporting 
and in our theoretical interpretation. An important avenue of research will be the continued 
development of studies, observational and experimental, in more controlled environments that seek 
to examine, with temporal and spatial precision, the processes by which external cues are 
encountered and responded to. Such studies may valuably inform our understanding of both the 
mechanics (in terms of intervention and participant characteristics) of existing, conceptually similar 
interventions that are currently being applied in less controlled, real-world settings, and also aid in 
the development of new interventions.  
 
Next steps 
  
 The key implication of the framework we have outlined is that those wanting to test and 
develop interventions that target non-conscious processes should consider attempting to characterise 
such processes by collecting primary data from intervention studies, alongside undertaking 
conceptual development work relating to methods of assessment and the mechanisms that they 
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putatively represent. In this article, we propose what we regard to be a practicable starting point for 
this. We should also focus on improving our ability to characterise the nature and active 
components of interventions to change behaviour, in order to gain insight into why some 
interventions may elicit or require greater or lesser degrees of conscious engagement than others. 
As such, ongoing efforts to improve our understanding of the content, mechanisms and means of 
delivery of behaviour change interventions (Hollands et al., 2013; Michie et al., 2013) are 
complementary and should occur in parallel. 
The central premise here is that interventions that rely less on conscious engagement and 
instead target non-conscious processes have significant potential for changing behaviour in 
populations. Increasing efforts to assess awareness would enable opportunities to begin testing this 
important premise which, if confirmed, would enhance the identification and development of 
effective interventions. First, at the aggregate, between-study level, it would enable the 
effectiveness of interventions in changing behaviour to be examined in relation to the degree to 
which they target non-conscious processes to change behaviour. Given sufficient primary data 
collection and accompanying conceptual developments, such an analysis could ultimately be 
possible within a systematic review framework. Second, at the more detailed within-study level, 
analysis could be conducted to examine the relationship between level of awareness of the 
intervention mechanism and its effects on behaviour. This would enable us to determine, for 
example, how the effect on behaviour differs between subgroups who are categorised as aware 
versus unaware (and whether the intervention remains effective when awareness is controlled for) 
and how closely subjective awareness of behaviour change maps on to actually observed changes in 
behaviour.  
Finally, it would enable another key hypothesis (outlined in more detail elsewhere (Marteau 
et al., 2015)) to be examined, concerning the potential for behaviour change interventions to reduce 
health inequalities arising from the higher rates of unhealthier behaviours in more deprived groups. 
Because interventions that are less reliant on conscious, reflective engagement depend less on levels 
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of literacy, numeracy and executive function, they may be particularly effective in those who are 
most socially and materially deprived and who can be disadvantaged in such domains. For example, 
there is evidence that person-centred behaviour change interventions that involve individual-level 
education and counselling may widen inequalities, whilst those that instead alter the environments 
that people are exposed to do not appear to do so (McGill et al., 2015). One could therefore 
examine whether interventions categorised as primarily targeting non-conscious processes are at 
least equally effective irrespective of how deprived the population they are applied to is, thus 
suggesting that their implementation would not further increase (and may even reduce) health 
inequalities.  
Whilst our predominant focus in this article has been on interventions that do not target 
conscious deliberation and are instead more likely to activate behaviour outside awareness, our 
framework can also be applied to more reflective interventions, which we would expect to cluster 
on the opposing end of an assumed spectrum of awareness. Testing this assertion will also require 
the assessment of awareness in intervention contexts that we may currently assume work 
predominantly via conscious activation of behaviour. A final point is that, although we have framed 
this work primarily in relation to interventions to change health-related behaviour with the purpose 
of improving health, any developments in this area have the potential to inform other contexts in 
which the goal is to change behaviours across populations, such as pro-environmental behaviours to 
mitigate climate change (e.g. energy use and recycling), and consumer behaviours, where the 
purpose may be to change consumption in a way that may harm health. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The framework we have outlined provides a basis for developing tests of our original 
premise, namely that interventions that target non-conscious processes and are less reliant on 
reflective, conscious engagement have significant potential for changing behaviour across 
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populations. At this early stage of development, the potential value of the proposed framework rests 
principally in informing attempts to assess whether, a) awareness of the effects of interventions, as 
measured in the outlined way, will indeed vary by degree, and that b) this has implications for 
understanding and ultimately enhancing their effectiveness in changing behaviour. There are 
undoubtedly significant conceptual and practical challenges to be overcome, but we assert that these 
are outweighed by the potential benefits of such an approach. These include theoretical and 
methodological developments as well as, ultimately, interventions to change population behaviour 
that are both better understood and more effective.  
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FIGURE CAPTIONS 
 
Figure 1 – Conscious and non-conscious processes underlying behavioural activation cued by 
exposure to an external stimulus.  
The black path represents behavioural activation that would be regarded as conscious, whereby the 
actor is aware of a causal link between a stimulus and a behaviour. The grey paths represent a 
behaviour that would be regarded as non-conscious, whereby the actor is unaware of the causal link 
between a stimulus and a behaviour. The green-red shading represents the conscious-nonconscious 
spectrum, whereby awareness of each element is of a degree on a spectrum depending on the level 
at which awareness is analysed.  
NB This figure is intended to provide a simple representation of behaviour activation and so does 
not include goal activation processes, but the principles apply equally to behaviours for which goals 
are represented and those for which they are not. 
 
 
Figure 2 – A framework of conscious and non-conscious activation of behaviour by an 
intervention.  
Conscious activation of behaviour (green) is characterised by awareness of both the intervention 
and the behavioural response. Non-conscious activation of behaviour (red) is characterised by a lack 
of awareness of the intervention and/or the behavioural response. Moderately conscious activation 
of behaviour (light green) indicates an assumed spectrum. For the purposes of this figure, we 
assume that, where there is some awareness of both intervention and behaviour components, an 
awareness of the causal link between these has also been generated to a varying degree (should this 
be absent, then the behaviour would inevitably be regarded as non-conscious). 
 
